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1 Introduction
Many observers believe that the costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations tend to be small.1 In
computing the welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations, however, most models to date either
abstract from unemployment risk altogether or they do not account for the endogenous relation of
unemployment risk with the state of the business cycle.2 Yet, job-ﬁnding probabilities are highly
volatile over and strongly correlated with the cycle, as shown in Shimer (2005), and the duration
of unemployment rises signiﬁcantly in recessions. Consequently, as pointed out by Costain and
Reiter (2005b) the exogeneity of unemployment risk is a possible weakness of previous estimates
of the welfare costs of business cycles: unemployment risk induced by aggregate ﬂuctuations
might, in an endogenous fashion, signiﬁcantly add to an individual’s consumption risk – at least
for groups of workers that lack the ability to (self)-insure themselves against this risk.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: We ﬁrst present a New Keynesian DSGE model with real,
monetary and labor market frictions and estimate it on six major macroeconomic time-series us-
ing Bayesian techniques. Given that our model economy works on a monthly time-scale, we show
how to time-aggregate the model by treating monthly observations of the endogenous variables
as latent while assuming that only the quarterly averages are observable to the econometrician.
We ﬁnd that Shimer’s (2005) initial pessimism with respect to the working of macroeconomic
labor market search and matching models is unwarranted. The model replicates the entire
time-path of unemployment rates almost perfectly without having used the information in the
estimation process.
Secondly, we provide an estimate of the welfare cost of business cycle risk for the society as a
whole and for groups of workers that do not have the means to self-insure their consumption
against unemployment risk. As noted by many authors, a sizeable fraction of US households
does not have enough wealth to smooth out market-traded consumption during an unemploy-
ment spell despite the fact that unemployment spells tend to be short-lived in the US. The
welfare of this group may thus be especially susceptible to labor market risk induced by cyclical
ﬂuctuations. In the current paper, we rely on an estimate by Gruber (2001) to calibrate the size
of the liquidity-constrained group. Using Survey of Income and Program Participation data he
estimates that 16% of US households do not have the wealth to cover even 10% of the income
1 See the classic article by Lucas (1987) and the recent surveys by Barlevy (2005) and Lucas (2003).
2 The seminal work by Krusell and Smith (1999), for example, assumes that “unemployment” is an idiosyncratic
and exogenous shock.
1lost during a typical unemployment spell.3 Given the lack of data on individual consumption
for these consumers, we identify the group with low-skilled workers that have a particularly
high unemployment risk, and use the estimated model to back out their consumption process.4
The assumption of a lack of self-insurance possibilities combined with high unemployment risk
provides us with an upper bound estimate of welfare costs induced by cyclical ﬂuctuations in
labor market risk for workers at the bottom end of the wealth distribution. The remaining part
of households/workers in our economy are perfectly insured against short-falls of consumption
due to unemployment by a large “family”. The family insurance assumption follows den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000) and is used widely, e.g. in Trigari (2006) and Krause and Lubik
(2005).5
Estimates of business cycle costs depend crucially on replicating key properties, i.e. correlations
and standard deviations, of the data that either directly inﬂuence per-period utility, as is the
case of consumption and hours worked, or which concern the particular labor market risks, in
our case the job-ﬁnding probabilities. This necessitates an accurate empirical description of
the labor market in the model. New Keynesian DSGE models to date mostly abstract from
the functioning of the labor market, see for example the widely cited papers by Christiano,
3 We assume the absence of any storage technology for this liquidity-constrained part of the population. One
might consider that these consumers could still save into cash or durable consumption goods. The ﬁrst option,
however, is not supported by the micro data; besides Gruber (2001) see Wolﬀ (1998). Durable goods in turn
tend to be illiquid and cannot easily be used to out smooth non-durable consumption. Our calibration for the
size of the liquidity-constrained group is in line with other studies on the wealth distribution. Wolﬀ (1998),
for example, analyzes the Survey of Consumer Finances in 1995. He ﬁnds that 18.5% of households have zero
or negative net worth, and that 28.7% of households have zero or negative ﬁnancial (i.e. liquid) wealth. In
addition, ﬁnancial wealth is highly correlated with labor income. In this sample, the households at the 40%
(20%) lower end of the income distribution hold an amount of ﬁnancial wealth that would enable them to
sustain their consumption – if self-reliant – for an average of just 1 month (zero months). Iacoviello (2005)
makes a similar distinction between savers and spenders (in Mankiw’s, 2000, terminology). In his framework,
a fraction of households is more impatient and thus ends up facing a binding (albeit non-zero) borrowing
constraint in equilibrium.
4 Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2005) use the pre-announced 2001 U.S. tax rebates as a natural experiment.
Examining answers to a set of questions in the Consumer Expenditure Survey directly targeted at these
rebates, they ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of diﬀerent spending behavior across diﬀerent income and wealth groups.
Responses are much larger for households with low liquid wealth or low income, consistent with liquidity
constraints particularly for the lower-skilled population.
5 An advantage of this strict formulation of a stylized income and wealth distribution is that we can handle a
richer state space and thus allow for more complex (unemployment and aggregate) dynamics than, say, Krusell
and Smith (2002) or Costain and Reiter (2005b), which is needed in a New Keynesian environment. Costain
and Reiter construct a version of the Krusell and Smith heterogeneous agent RBC economy with endogenous
labor markets to study the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and optimal insurance and arrive at average welfare
costs of around 0.27% of steady state consumption. The similarity with part of our results suggests that the
detailed modeling of the wealth distribution and of state-dependent borrowing constraints may not be of ﬁrst-
order importance when assessing the welfare costs of business cycles, lending some support to our simpliﬁed
modeling choice of focussing on only two, albeit extreme, groups of workers.
2Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2005). For generating unemployment
ﬂuctuations endogenously, we make use of an extensive literature which started with Shimer’s
(2005) observation that the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework would not match business
cycle ﬂuctuations in labor market variables. In particular, Shimer (2004), Hall (2005), Costain
and Reiter (2005a), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and Jung (2005) among others provide
mechanisms that allow the model to be consistent with the observed unemployment variability.
Essentially, all these mechanisms need to achieve a strongly pro-cyclical proﬁt-share so that ﬁrms’
hiring activity is also procyclical. Within a Nash-bargaining framework this can be generated
either by assuming an outside option of the worker which is not much correlated with the business
cycle as in Hall and Milgrom (2007) or by a small match surplus as in Jung (2005) or Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2006). Alternatively, assumptions on the technology process would suﬃce. For
example, Costain and Reiter (2005a) amplify ﬂuctuations in proﬁts by assuming that in booms
better jobs are created than in recessions. In this paper we follow the ﬁrst two routes.
While the precise mechanism by which unemployment ﬂuctuations are induced is not crucial for
key moments of labor market variables in the model, for the purpose of this paper the details
matter to a great extent. Diﬀerent mechanisms imply a diﬀerent value for a central determinant
of business cycle costs: the surplus which a worker obtains from being employed relative to
being unemployed and therefore the average insurance provided to the household or worker.
At the one extreme, the bargaining setup developed in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) relies
on a small match surplus to generate the right degree of unemployment volatility. This leaves
a worker almost indiﬀerent between unemployment and market work merely by assumption –
with consequences for the ensuing costs of business cycles. Alternatively, Hall and Milgrom
(2007) have proposed a sequential bargaining game which can be calibrated to generate the
same unemployment ﬂuctuations as in the data but which does not rely on such a small match
surplus. In particular, they show that if the outside option in the wage bargaining process
is delaying the bargaining instead of quitting into unemployment, the outside option of the
worker in the bargaining process can be high without this high outside option being related
to income/consumption streams when unemployed. Relying on this insight allows us to trace
out the costs of business cycles if unemployment beneﬁts are signiﬁcantly below labor income
without negatively aﬀecting the cyclical properties of the model.
We ﬁnd that society as a whole would pay at least .2% of steady state consumption to avoid
business cycle ﬂuctuations completely, while workers who have no means to self-insure them-
3selves and who obtain, as an absolute extreme case, only 10% of their former wage income as
replacement income when unemployed would pay around 1.3% of their steady state consump-
tion. These results suggest that the pure unemployment and income risk caused by business
cycle ﬂuctuations is still of relatively low importance in this type of models, even though sub-
stantially higher in absolute terms than in Lucas (1987). To obtain higher estimates of the
business cycle costs as, for example, in Krebs (2007) the endogeneity of a signiﬁcant share of the
unemployment risk over the business cycle does not seem to be suﬃcient. Instead, in order to
obtain larger welfare costs, one would likely need to rely on additional correlated risk factors. In
Krebs’ case, for instance, the risk of the loss of job-speciﬁc skills and human capital oﬀ the job
increases wage losses associated with unemployment risk. Alternatively, de Santis (2007) argues
that accounting for non-business cycle related idiosyncratic risk leads to a stronger impact of
any business cycle risk on the welfare costs of business cycles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical model
that we will analyze. Section 3 turns to the calibration and the estimation of the model. Section
4 discusses the welfare criteria used and presents estimates of the welfare costs of business
cycle ﬂuctuations. The same section also analyzes which share of the business cycle costs is
due to endogenous co-movement of unemployment risk with the business cycle. A ﬁnal section
concludes. An Appendix presents a summary of the data and an outline of the estimation
strategy.
2 The Model
We incorporate search and matching frictions ` a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) into an
otherwise standard New Keynesian business cycle model, the core of which is close to Smets
and Wouters (2003). Consumers fall into two categories: those who can save into bonds, stocks
and physical capital and those who are prevented from access to asset markets.6 The model’s
production side features competitive factor markets in the only price-setting sector. The degree
of nominal rigidity should thus be interpreted in this light.7 One time period in the model refers
to a calendar time of one month.
6 Our modeling ensures a certain degree of homogeneity in asset-holdings. For asset-holding workers we entertain
a family structure which pools all assets. The other group of workers does not hold any assets (not even
currency). This keeps the analysis computationally feasible.
7 See, e.g., Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) about ﬁrmspe-
ciﬁc factor markets and the interpretation of a certain slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
42.1 Preferences and Consumers’ Constraints
There is a large number of identical families in the economy with measure ν ∈ [0,1]. Each family
consists of a measure of 1−u
(1)
t employed members and u
(1)
t unemployed members. The families
hold all assets in the economy. Consequently, proﬁt income in the economy accrues entirely to
this part of the population. The representative family pools the income of its working members,
unemployment beneﬁts of the unemployed members and ﬁnancial income from ﬁnancial assets
which they hold via a mutual fund. There is also a measure 1−ν (potentially zero) of individuals
not associated with any family. These are assumed not to have access to ﬁnancial markets. In
period t, a measure u
(2)
t of these constrained workers are unemployed. We assume that the
mass of liquidity-constrained consumers does not vary over time and normalize the total mass
of consumers in the economy to one. We index the diﬀerent types by superscript (o) ∈ {1,2}.
Consumers have time-additive expected utility preferences. Preferences of consumer i can be
represented by
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where E0 marks expectations conditional on period 0 information. u(o)
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{1,2}, is a standard period utility function of the form8
u(o)(c
(o)
i,t ,co
t−1,h
(o)
i,t ) =
(c
(o)
i,t − ̺(o)c
(o)
t−1)1−σ
1 − σ
− κL
 
h
(o)
i,t
 1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
,σ > 0,ϕ > 0. (2)
Here, c
(o)
i,t denotes consumption of member i and h
(o)
i,t are hours worked by member i in group o.
Utility also depends on external habit persistence, indexed by parameter ̺(o) ∈ [0,1). External
habit is assumed to take past aggregate consumption of the respective group of agents, c
(o)
t−1, as
the reference point. κL is a positive scaling parameter of disutility of work.
2.1.1 The Families of Asset-holding Workers
The representative family maximizes the sum of expected utilities of its individual members,
W
(1)
0 =
  1
0
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di. (3)
8 See Jung (2005) for the more general but also less tractable case of utility allowing for balanced growth.
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the aggregate per-period utility function of the family:
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where c
(1)
t is the average consumption level of family members and {h
(1)
i,t } is shorthand for a
potential distribution of hours contracts. We will later focus on a symmetric equilibrium in
which each employed family member indeed works exactly the same hours and receives the same
wage. Given its arguments, utility function U(·,·,·,·) gives the value of per-period family-utility
when c
(1)
t is optimally distributed among family members.9Only a part of the consumption
goods needs to be acquired in the market. c
(1,m)
t is the amount of resources spent on acquiring
these. Unemployed family members also engage in home production, which is not tradable in
the market but can be shared by family members. Total consumption per capita thus is
c
(1)
t = c
(1,m)
t + u
(1)
t home(1), (5)
where home(1) marks the state-independent value of home-production by an unemployed family
member.
Family members, i.e. workers of type 1, pool their income. Their budget constraint is given by
c
(1,m)
t + it + tt =
  1−u
(1)
t
0
w
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i,t h
(1)
i,t di + u
(1)
t b(1) +
1
ν
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+ Ψt + rk
t ztkt−1 − ψ(zt)kt−1, (6)
where it marks real investment per family member. So aggregate investment is given by ν it.
Both it and c
(1,m)
t are choice variables of the family. w
(1)
i,t h
(1)
i,t is the real wage per hour multiplied
by hours worked by individual household member i. tt are lump-sum taxes per capita payable
by the family. b(1) are real unemployment beneﬁts paid to unemployed family members.10 The
family holds 1
νDt units of a risk-free one-period nominal bond (government debt) with gross
nominal return Rtǫb
t. ǫb
t denotes a serially correlated shock to the risk premium. It drives a
9 It can be shown that
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di.
10 The diﬀerence between unemployment beneﬁts and home production in our setup is that the former are
payable in cash and can thus be used to acquire market-tradable consumption goods, while the latter will not
show up in the national accounts.
6wedge between the return on assets held by households and the interest rate controlled by the
central bank, see Smets and Wouters (2007). The household also owns representative shares of
all ﬁrms in the economy. Ψt denotes real dividend income per member of the family arising from
these ﬁrms’ proﬁts:
Ψt =
1
ν
 
ΨC
t + ν(1 − u
(1)
t )Ψ
(1)
t + (1 − ν)(1 − u
(2)
t )Ψ
(2)
t
 
. (7)
Here ΨC
t ,Ψ
(1)
t and Ψ
(2)
t are the proﬁts arising in the diﬀerentiating industry and in the two labor
good industries; see Section 2.2. kt is the amount of physical capital held per member of the
family. The family chooses the capacity utilization rate zt and leases its eﬀective capital, ztkt−1,
to wholesale ﬁrms in a perfectly competitive capital market. The real rental rate of capital is
rk
t . The increasing, convex function ψ(zt) denotes the resource cost, in units of consumption
goods, of setting the utilization rate to zt. We assume that
ψ(zt) = γz,1(zt − 1) +
γz,2
2
(zt − 1)2,
where γz,1 and γz,2 are such that ψ(1) = 0, ψ′(1) = rk, ψ′′(1) > 0, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005).11
Capital accumulation is subject to capital adjustment costs summarized by the function S(·).
kt = kt−1(1 − δ) +
 
1 − S
 
it
it−1
  
ǫI
tit. (8)
Here δ is the monthly rate of capital depreciation and ǫI
t is a serially correlated “investment
shock” with unit steady state. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) we assume that
S(1) = 0, S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0. The functional form we use is
S
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=
κI
2
 
it
it−1
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 2
, κI > 0.
2.1.2 The Family’s First-order Conditions
The family maximizes (3) by choosing per-capita capital, kt, investment, it, consumption, c
(1,m)
t ,
capacity utilization, zt, and bond-holdings, Dt, subject to (6) and (8). The ﬁrst-order condition
for investment is
qk
t S′
t(·)
ǫI
tit
it−1
− βEt
 
qk
t+1
λt+1
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t+1(·)
 
it+1
it
 2
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+ 1 = qk
t (1 − St)ǫI
t, (9)
11 Here as in the remainder of the paper, endogenous variables which do not carry a time index refer to steady
state values. r
k, for example, denotes the steady state value of r
k
t .
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t is the shadow value of installed capital (measured in consumption
units). λt =
∂U(c
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t ,...)
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 −σ
is the marginal family utility of additional con-
sumption for each of the family members. The ﬁrst-order condition for capital can be written
as
qk
t = Et
 
β
λt+1
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qk
t+1(1 − δ) + rk
t+1zt+1 − ψ(zt+1)
  
. (10)
Capacity utilization is chosen so as to equate the real return on capital and the marginal cost
of capacity utilization
rk
t = ψ′(zt). (11)
Bonds are chosen so as to intertemporally equate marginal utilities of consumption:
1 = Et
 
β
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λt
Rtǫb
t
Πt+1
 
. (12)
Finally, the optimal consumption plan satisﬁes the two transversality conditions
lim
j→∞
Et
 
βjλt+j
λt
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= 0, ∀t. (13)
and
lim
j→∞
Et
 
βjλt+j
λt
Dt+j
Pt+j
 
= 0, ∀t. (14)
We turn to describe preferences and budget constraints of liquidity-constrained consumers.
2.1.3 Liquidity-constrained Consumers
Liquidity-constrained consumers are not automatically insured by a family. They do not have
access to liquidity-providing services and ﬁnancial markets. They also cannot insure each other
against the risk of becoming unemployed and cannot share their home-production with others.
Liquidity-constrained consumers seek to maximize expected utility (1), which is reproduced here
for type o = 2 workers for convenience:
E0
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t=0
βtu(2)(c
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i,t ,c
(2)
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(2)
i,t )
 
, (15)
where period utility is of the form (2). Throughout the paper we do not assume that liquidity-
constrained workers develop consumption habits, ̺(2) = 0. Due to being prevented from saving
and borrowing, liquidity-constrained consumers always consume their entire income. That is,
their budget constraint is given by
c
(2)
i,t =



c
(2)
e,i,t = w
(2)
i,t h
(2)
i,t if employed
c
(2)
u,i,t = b(2) + home(2) if unemployed.
(16)
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(2)
e,i,t marks consumption of liquidity-constrained consumer i if he is employed. c
(2)
u,i,t is the
consumption level if he is unemployed. b(2) are real unemployment beneﬁts paid to unemployed
liquidity-constrained workers. Home-production of liquidity-constrained workers is denoted by
home(2). In the model taxes, tt, are levied in a lump-sum fashion. In order to eliminate any
dependance of the evolution of the economy on the precise nature of the tax rule only the
(Ricardian) families/asset-holding households pay taxes.
2.2 Firms
There are three sectors of production. One sector produces a homogenous intermediate good,
which we shall call the “labor good”. Firms in this sector need to ﬁnd exactly one worker in order
to produce. They take hours worked as their sole input into production. In the model, searching
for a worker is a costly and time-consuming process due to matching frictions. Once a ﬁrm and
a worker have met, they Nash-bargain over wages and hours on a period-by-period basis. Labor
goods are sold to a wholesale sector in a perfectly competitive market. Wholesale ﬁrms take
intermediate labor goods and physical capital as inputs, and produce diﬀerentiated goods using
a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Subject to price-setting impediments ` a la
Calvo (1983), they sell to a ﬁnal sector under monopolistic competition.12 The ﬁnal sector is a
retail sector. Retailers bundle diﬀerentiated goods into a homogenous consumption/investment
basket, yt. They sell this ﬁnal good to consumers and to the government at price Pt. We next
turn to a detailed description of the respective sectors in reverse order.
2.2.1 Retail Firms
The retail sector operates in perfectly competitive factor markets. It takes amounts yj,t of
wholesale good type j ∈ [0,1] as an input to production and aggregates all varieties into the
ﬁnal homogenous consumption and investment good, yt, according to
yt =
   1
0
y
ǫ−1
ǫ
j,t dj
  ǫ
ǫ−1
,ǫ > 1. (17)
The cost-minimizing expenditure, Pt, needed to produce one unit of the ﬁnal good is given by
Pt =
   1
0
P1−ǫ
j,t dj
  1
1−ǫ
, (18)
12 Following the literature (see e.g. Trigari, 2006) we part the markup pricing decision from the labor hiring
decision.
9where Pj,t marks the price of good yj,t. Pt coincides with the consumer/GDP price index. The
demand function for each single good yj,t is given by
yj,t =
 
Pj,t
Pt
 −ǫ
yt. (19)
2.2.2 Wholesale Firms
Firms in the wholesale sector have unit mass and are indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Firm j produces
variety j of a diﬀerentiated good according to
yj,t = kα
j,tl1−α
j,t , α ∈ (0,1). (20)
Here kj,t denotes demand for capital by wholesale ﬁrm j. Capital is homogenous and instan-
taneously transferable across ﬁrms. Demand for capital is satisﬁed out of the utilization, zt, of
the capital stock formed up to t − 1, νkt−1, where kt−1 denotes the amount of capital to which
each member of the family is entitled. Total supply of capital services in period t is νztkt−1. lj,t
denotes the demand for the intermediate labor good which a wholesale ﬁrm j can acquire in a
perfectly competitive market at real price xL
t . Real period proﬁts of ﬁrm j, ΨC
j,t, are given by
ΨC
j,t =
Pj,t
Pt
yj,t − ǫC
t
 
kj,trk
t + lj,txL
t
 
.
The ﬁrst term gives wholesale ﬁrm revenues, the second term marks real payments for capital
and for the labor good. ǫC
t represents a wholesale sector cost-push shock with unit steady state.13
We follow Yun (1996) in assuming that in each period a random fraction ω ∈ [0,1) of ﬁrms
cannot reoptimize their price. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2003), ﬁrms which cannot reoptimize instead index their price to realized inﬂation,
Πt−1 :=
Pt−1
Pt−2. The degree of indexation is measured by parameter γp ∈ [0,1]. Those ﬁrms which
reoptimize their price in period t face the problem of maximizing the value of their enterprise by
choosing their sales price, Pj,t, taking into account the pricing frictions, demand function (19)
and production function (20). Realizing that for any given demand, the optimal factor input
choice leads to marginal costs which are independent of the production level, the price-setting
problem simpliﬁes to
max
Pj,t
Et
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s=0
ωsβt,t+s
 
Pj,t
Pt+j
s−1  
l=0
 
(Πt+l−1)
γp Π1−γp 
− mct+s
 
yj,t+s
 
. (21)
13 In the literature this shock frequently is also labeled a price-markup shock, compare Smets and Wouters
(2005). Both representations are identical up to ﬁrst-order.
10Here Π is the gross inﬂation rate in steady state and mct are real marginal costs14
mct = ǫC
t (rk
t )α(xL
t )1−αα−α(1 − α)−(1−α). (22)
βt,t+s := βs λt+s
λt is the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. The typical reoptimizing wholesale
ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition for price-setting is:
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−
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= 0, (23)
where P∗
t marks the optimal price. The demand functions of individual ﬁrms for the labor good
and capital are, respectively,
lj,t = mct
1 − α
xL
t ǫC
t
yj,t (24)
and
kj,t = mct
α
rk
t ǫC
t
yj,t. (25)
Total real proﬁts of the wholesale (Calvo) sector are ΨC
t =
  1
0 ΨC
j,tdj, where
ΨC
j,t =
 
Pj,t
Pt
− mct
 
yj,t (26)
denotes the period proﬁts of ﬁrm j.15 These proﬁts ﬂow to the families of asset-holding workers.
2.2.3 Labor Good Firms
The labor good is homogenous. Each ﬁrm in this sector consists of one and only one worker
matched with an entrepreneur/a production technology. In period t there is thus a mass ν(1 −
14 Due to the assumption of competitive factor markets and constant returns to scale, all ﬁrms in the wholesale
sector face the same level of marginal costs in equilibrium. Especially, in this speciﬁcation marginal costs are
independent of each ﬁrm’s output. Similar to Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) one could also
make ﬁrms’ marginal costs depend on the level of own output by assuming ﬁrmspeciﬁc production factors, say
capital. This would introduce an internal motive to keep prices constant and so require less Calvo stickiness; see
also Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) and Woodford (2005). For an application which operates with temporarily
ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor and a matching market in the price-setting sector, see Kuester (2007).
15 Real proﬁts in equilibrium thus depend on the distribution of Pj,t :
Ψ
C
t =
 
1 − mct
  1
0
 
Pj,t
Pt
 −ǫ
dj
 
yt.
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(1)
t ) of labor ﬁrms with workers of type o = 1 and a mass (1−ν)(1−u
(2)
t ) with workers of type
o = 2. Match i can produce amount li,t of the labor good according to
li,t = A
(o)
t h
(o)
i,t . (27)
Labor productivity, A
(o)
t , depends on which type of the worker is employed at the respective
ﬁrm. Throughout the paper we assume that liquidity-constrained workers are lower-skilled and
thus relatively less productive. In particular, we assume that the productivity levels of low- and
high-skilled workers are linked by a constant factor of proportionality a:
A
(2)
t = aA
(1)
t , a ∈ (0,1).
In equilibrium, labor good demand by the wholesale sector must match the labor good sector’s
supply:
lt :=
  1
0
lj,tdj =
  ν(1−u
(1)
t )
0
li,tdi +
  (1−ν)(1−u
(2)
t )
0
li,tdi. (28)
2.3 Labor Market
We now turn to the speciﬁcation of the labor market in our model. We ﬁrst describe the
matching technology and then focus on the bargaining and vacancy posting decisions for each
class of worker o ∈ {1,2}.
2.3.1 Matching Firms and Workers
There is a separate matching market for the two types of workers. Or, put diﬀerently, there
are jobs exclusively suited for lower-skilled workers and other jobs exclusively suited for higher-
skilled workers. The matching process in each market is governed by a standard Cobb-Douglas
matching technology
m
(o)
t = σ(o)
m (u
(o)
t )ξ(o)
(v
(o)
t )1−ξ(o)
, σ(o)
m > 0,ξ(o) ∈ (0,1). (29)
Here m
(o)
t is the number of new matches of workers of type o, v
(o)
t is the number of vacancies
of type o. With probability q
(o)
t =
m
(o)
t
v
(o)
t
a ﬁrm with a vacant position ﬁnds a worker in period
t. Unemployed workers always search for a job. With probability s
(o)
t =
m
(o)
t
u
(o)
t
an unemployed
worker of type o will ﬁnd a job. For future reference, we deﬁne market tightness in sector o from
the ﬁrms’ point of view as θ
(o)
t =
v
(o)
t
u
(o)
t
.
12In the US, most of the variation of employment over the business cycle is explained by variations
in vacancy posting, see Hall (2005), while the separation rate is rather stable. We therefore
assume that separations occur with a constant, exogenous probability ϑ(o) ∈ (0,1) in each
period. New matches in t, m
(o)
t , become productive for the ﬁrst time in t+1. As a consequence
of these assumptions, the employment rate n
(o)
t := 1 − u
(o)
t evolves according to
n
(o)
t = (1 − ϑ(o))n
(o)
t−1 + m
(o)
t−1. (30)
2.3.2 Bargaining of Asset-holding Families
Due to both a skill-dependent cost κ(1) of posting a vacancy and the time-consuming matching
process, formed matches entail economic rents. Firms and workers bargain about their share of
the overall match surplus. Since the family perfectly insures its members against unemployment
risks, individual members would not take up work voluntarily. We follow den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000) in assuming that the family takes the labor supply decision for its workers.
We start by describing the gain of a representative family from having an additional, marginal
member i in employment. This can be shown to be (see Jung, 2005, for a derivation):
∆
(1)
t = λt
 
w
(1)
i,t h
(1)
i,t − b(1) − home(1) − strike(1)
 
− κL
 
h
(1)
i,t
 1+ϕ
1+ϕ
+(1 − s
(1)
t − ϑ(1))Et
 
β∆
(1)
t+1
 
.
(31)
The ﬁrst term describes the diﬀerence between the wage earned by a marginal member when
employed and the unemployment replacement income, b(1). This diﬀerence is converted to
marginal utility units by λt. Diﬀerent mechanisms which achieve ﬂuctuations in unemployment
are consistent with the data. In our estimated benchmark, we follow Jung (2005) and Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2006). Their calibration relies on a high replacement rate (a high value for
b(o)
(wh)(o)). Equation (31), however, suggests that any decomposition of the outside option, which
preserves the same high value for b(o) + home(o) + strike(o) as in the baseline, will induce the
same ﬂuctuation of unemployment. A high outside option in the bargaining process can, for
example, result if the worker can prop up a certain level of beneﬁts by a positive amount of home
production, home(o), when unemployed. This helps him to self-insure against unemployment.
While the decomposition of the outside option does not matter for business cycle behavior,
it does have a bearing on the estimates of the costs of business cycles. Both the baseline
13and the modeling scheme with home-production rely on a relatively high (explicit or implicit)
replacement rate. They thus imply relatively low welfare costs of business cycles. In order to
allow for a larger gap between market work and non-market income, we entertain a further
modeling device: Parameter strike(o) ≥ 0 is meant to capture the fact that the bargaining
position of the worker may be high without this being reﬂected by consumption accruing to the
worker in the state of unemployment. A variety of institutional features or diﬀerent bargaining
structures might be used to rationalize the assumption of a positive value of parameter strike(o).
Appendix D illustrates, for example, that this scheme is very closely linked to a bargaining setup
suggested by Hall and Milgrom (2007) in which the outside option of both parties is to delay
the bargaining process – and not to terminate the bargaining process altogether.16 The second
term in equation (31) describes the increase in the disutility of work when working. The ﬁnal
term pertains to the continuation value.
We assume that ﬁrms cease to exist when they separate from a worker. They then are replaced
by a new ﬁrm. The market value, J
(1)
t , of a representative ﬁrm with a worker of type o = 1 is
given by
J
(1)
t = xL
t A1
th
(1)
i,t − w
(1)
i,t h
(1)
i,t + (1 − ϑ(1))Et
 
βt,t+1J
(1)
t+1
 
. (32)
Each period, wages and hours worked are determined by means of Nash-bargaining over the
match surplus:
arg max
w
(1)
i,t ,h
(1)
i,t
 
∆
(1)
t
  (1)  
J
(1)
t
 1− (1)
(33)
where  (1) ∈ (0,1) denotes the family’s bargaining power. In a symmetric equilibrium, all ﬁrms
with workers pertaining to asset-holding families hire the same amount of hours, h
(1)
t , and pay
the same wage, w
(1)
t . The associated ﬁrst-order condition for the wage choice is
 (1)λt
∆
(1)
t
=
1 −  (1)
J
(1)
t
. (34)
The associated ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked,
κL
 
h
(1)
t
 ϕ
λt
= xL
t A
(1)
t , (35)
states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours worked at the
family level is equal to the marginal product of labor. The resulting period proﬁts of the
16 Since bargaining is eﬃcient and workers and ﬁrms never break up their match voluntarily, the threat point in
the bargaining process will never be observable in practice. We use this degree of freedom to generate a high
enough outside option for the worker, such that proﬁts in the labor sector are small and such that the model
is consistent with the standard deviation of unemployment observed in the data.
14representative ﬁrm with a worker of type 1, Ψ
(1)
t = xL
t A1
th
(1)
t − w
(1)
t h
(1)
t , accrue to the family.
Using the vacancy posting condition derived below in (37), one can show that the following wage
equation obtains.
w
(1)
t h
(1)
t =  (1)
 
A
(1)
t h
(1)
t xL
t + θ
(1)
t κ(1)
 
+(1 −  (1))
 
b(1) + home(1) + strike(1) + 1
1+ϕmrs
(1)
t h
(1)
t
  (36)
where mrs
(1)
t := κL
 
h
(1)
t
 ϕ
λ
(1)
t
is the marginal rate of substitution of the family. Wage income is
therefore a convex combination of the ﬁrm’s revenue plus the savings from not having to re-
post a vacant position and the outside option deﬁned by the real consumption beneﬁt to the
worker from staying at home (b(1)+home(1)) plus the shift parameter strike(1), plus the value of
leisure expressed in terms of marginal consumption. For any given outside option, the better the
bargaining position of the worker is, captured here by a higher  (1), the closer is the wage rate
to the marginal productivity of the worker and therefore to the standard competitive model.
2.3.3 Vacancy Posting for Workers of Type 1
In order to stand a chance of ﬁnding a worker associated with a family, ﬁrms need to post a va-
cancy for higher-skilled workers. Vacancy posting costs enter the economy’s resource constraint
as pure waste. Closing our description of the labor market for asset-holding workers, we assume
free entry into the vacancy posting market as is standard in the literature. This guarantees
that expected proﬁts of new entrants, once properly discounted, are zero. The cost of posting a
vacancy, κ(1), in equilibrium thus equals the discounted expected proﬁts
κ(1) = Et
 
βt,t+1q
(1)
t J
(1)
t+1
 
, (37)
where βt,t+1 is the economy’s pricing kernel, q
(1)
t is the probability of ﬁnding a worker of type 1
once a vacancy has been posted and Jt+1 is the real value of the ﬁrm in t + 1.
2.3.4 Bargaining of Liquidity-Constrained Workers
Liquidity-constrained workers do not live in a family which provides consumption insurance.
Once matched, they bargain directly and individually with the ﬁrm, taking their own con-
sumption when unemployed as the threshold (plus the shift parameter to the outside option,
strike(2)). The utility diﬀerence in bargaining of a representative liquidity-constrained worker
15can then be written as
∆
(2)
t =
 
u(2)(c
(2)
e,t,c
(2)
t−1,h
(2)
t ) − u(2)(c
(2)
u,t + strike(2),c
(2)
t−1,0)
 
+ (1 − s
(2)
t − ϑ(2))Et
 
β∆
(2)
t+1
 
≡ ∆u(c
(2)
e,t,c
(2)
t−1,u2
t,h
(2)
t ) + (1 − s
(2)
t − ϑ(2))E
 
β∆
(2)
t+1
 
.
(38)
Where c
(2)
e,t and c
(2)
u,t, deﬁned in (16), are the consumption levels of the representative low-skilled
worker when employed and unemployed, respectively. A high replacement rate for this group of
consumers implicitly amounts to assuming that strong family ties also keep liquidity-constrained
workers well insured against unemployment, which keeps welfare costs of business cycles low.
As with the unconstrained worker’s bargaining, parameter strike(2) is meant to capture an
exogenous shift in the bargaining position of the worker not related to any real consumption
ﬂows. A type o = 2 ﬁrm discounts future proﬁt streams using the capital market’s pricing kernel,
associated with the typical asset-holding family. To shorten notation, denote period proﬁts of a
ﬁrm associated with a liquidity-constrained worker by
Ψ
(2)
t = xL
t A
(2)
t h
(2)
t − w
(2)
t h
(2)
t , (39)
where A
(2)
t is the time-varying productivity level of a liquidity-constrained, lower-skilled worker.
The market value of a ﬁrm with a low-skilled worker is given by
J
(2)
t = Ψ
(2)
t + (1 − ϑ(2))Et
 
βt,t+1J
(2)
t+1
 
. (40)
The Nash bargaining process deﬁnes how the joint match surplus is split among worker and
ﬁrm. In each period, the low-skilled worker and his employer set the real wage rate, w
(2)
t , and
hours worked, h
(2)
t , as
arg max
w
(2)
t ,h
(2)
t
(∆
(2)
t ) (2)
(J
(2)
t )1− (2)
, (41)
where  (2) ∈ (0,1) is the bargaining power of low-skilled workers. The wage-setting ﬁrst-order
condition is
 (2)λ
(2)
t
∆
(2)
t
=
(1 −  (2))
J
(2)
t
, (42)
where λ
(2)
t := (c
(2)
e,t −̺(2)c
(2)
t−1)−σ. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the hour choice yields
 (2)
 
λ
(2)
t w
(2)
t − κL
 
h
(2)
t
 ϕ 
∆
(2)
t
=
(1 −  (2))(w
(2)
t − xL
t A
(2)
t )
J
(2)
t
. (43)
Rearranging this equation shows that also in the low-skilled sector, the marginal product of
labor equals the marginal disutility of work in equilibrium.
162.3.5 Vacancy Posting for Workers of Type 2
Vacancy posting proceeds as for asset-holding workers. In order to have a chance, q
(2)
t , to ﬁnd a
worker, ﬁrms looking to recruit low-skilled workers need to post a vacancy at real cost κ(2) > 0.
To close the description of the labor market, we assume free entry into the vacancy posting
market for liquidity-constrained workers. This ensures zero ex-ante proﬁts:
κ(2) = Et
 
βt,t+1q
(2)
t J
(2)
t+1
 
. (44)
2.4 Government
The monetary authority controls the one-month risk-free interest rate on nominal bonds, Rt.
The empirical literature (see, e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 2000) ﬁnds that simple generalized
Taylor-type rules of the form
log(R)t = (1 − γR)log(Π/β)
+γR log(R)t−1 + (1 − γR)
 
γπ
3 log
 
Π
quart
t
Π
3
 
+
γy
12 log
 
y
quart
t
3y
  
+γ∆y log
 
yt
yt−1
 
+ log(ǫ
money
t ),
(45)
once linearized are a good representation of monetary policy in recent decades. Here y
quart
t =
(yt + yt−1 + yt−2) is quarterly output, Π
quart
t = Pt
Pt−3 is the three month inﬂation rate. ǫ
money
t is
an iid log-normal shock to the monetary policy stance with unit steady state. The speciﬁc form
of the rule is similar to the one used by Smets and Wouters (2005).
“Government spending”, gt, is exogenous and follows the AR(1) process
log(gt) = (1 − ρg)log(g) + ρg log(gt−1) + ǫ
g
t, ρg ∈ [0,1). (46)
g is the long-run target for government expenditures, ǫ
g
t is a Gaussian shock to ﬁscal policy with
zero mean.
The government budget constraint is given by
νtt + Dt
Pt + (ǫC
t − 1)
 
νkt−1ztrk
t + xL
t lt
 
= νu
(1)
t b(1) + (1 − ν)u
(2)
t b(2) +
Dt−1
Pt Rt−1 + gt. (47)
The government generates revenue from lump-sum taxes. It also earns income from new debt
issues, Dt
Pt . The ﬁnal term on the left-hand side of (47) clariﬁes the “tax” nature of the cost-push
shock. The shock distorts price-setting incentives but does not require real resources. On the
17expenditure-side appear unemployment beneﬁts (the terms involving b(1),b(2)), debt repayment
including coupon as well as the government expenditure.
Following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) we assume that lump-sum taxes, tt, adjust in order
to assure government solvency in all states of the world. With only asset-holding households
being subject to taxation, Ricardian equivalence obtains and the precise nature of the tax rule
does not have any bearing on the equilibrium allocations.
2.5 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the retail, wholesale, labor and capital markets clear. The aggregate retail good
is used for market consumption by the two types of consumers, for investment by asset-holding
households and for government spending. In addition, vacancy posting activity in the two labor
markets requires resources. Output is therefore used as
yt = c
(m)
t + ν [it + ψ(zt)kt−1] + gt + νκ(1)v
(1)
t + (1 − ν)κ(2)v
(2)
t , (48)
where aggregate market-tradable consumption demand, c
(m)
t , is given by
c
(m)
t = νc
(1,m)
t + (1 − ν)
 
(1 − u
(2)
t )c
(2)
e,t + u
(2)
t
 
c
(2)
u,t − home(2)
  
. (49)
3 Calibration and Estimation of the Benchmark Model
We conduct a Bayesian estimation exercise in which we use quarterly data for the US from
1964:q1 to 2005:q4. The start of the sample is dictated by the ﬁrst date at which the index
of average weekly hours worked which we employ is available. We treat output per capita,
consumption per capita, investment per capita, the nominal interest rate, GDP inﬂation and
total hours worked as observable variables. Consumption is measured as the sum of consumption
of non-durable goods and services. Investment is the sum of ﬁxed private investment and
consumption of durable goods. All data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’
database FRED II. Data on total compensation per capita, vacancies (measured by the help-
wanted index) and unemployment rates are used for validation purposes. Appendix A lists the
exact sources of the data and the deﬁnitions linking the data to our model.
The volatility of many aggregate variables has decreased since the early 1980s.17 We therefore
use the data up to 1983:q4 only to start the Kalman ﬁlter and let the observation sample start
18in 1984:q1. Calibrated steady state values are computed using the data from the latter part of
the sample. We follow Shimer (2005) in detrending our data with a low-frequency HP-ﬁlter with
a ﬁlter weight of 100,000. Agents in the model economy take decisions at a monthly frequency
while the data used for the estimation are quarterly. Appendix B shows how to time-aggregate
the model by treating monthly observations of the endogenous variables as latent while only
the quarterly averages are observable to the econometrician. Autocorrelation coeﬃcients, the
Calvo price-setting parameter, ω, and the interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient have been rescaled
to quarterly terms for better comparability with the literature. In the tables and the subsequent
text, this is indicated by a superscript q, for example ω ≡ (ωq)
1/3.
We discuss our calibration in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 discusses our priors regarding the remaining
parameters and the parameter values at the mode of the posterior distribution. Section 3.3
assesses to which extent the model matches second moments of the data and to which extent it
explains the evolution of the labor market over the business cycle.
3.1 Calibration to the US
We calibrate most parameters to long-run averages or outside information. Table 1 summarizes
our choices and gives the targets we match. Table 2 reports the resulting steady state.
Turning ﬁrst to preferences and the decompositon of skills, the savings of a notable share of the
US population cannot cover the consumption costs of an average unemployment spell. Gruber
(2001) reports that this is the case for at least 16% of the US population. Consequently, we set
the size of the liquidity-constrained group of workers to 1−ν = 0.16 (see section ‘Preferences and
composition’ in Table 1).18 Consumers in the diﬀerent skill groups share the same preferences
apart from habit persistence. We set the time-discount factor to β = 0.9975 targeting an annual
real rate of 3%. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is set to 0.5 as estimated by Domeij and
Flod´ en (2006), which implies ϕ = 2. The value of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient, σ = 1.5, follows the
estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007). Liquidity-constrained consumers are highly dependent
on their current income. They therefore do not develop consumption habits, ̺(2) = 0. We,
17 Kim and Nelson (1999) locate the break date in the amplitude of US GDP growth rates and the volatility of
shocks to US GDP growth rates at 1984:q1 (their posterior mode). The same break date is found by McConnell
and Perez-Quiros (2000). Stock and Watson (2002) document that this evidence is not limited to real GDP
growth but can be found in a great number of US macroeconomic time series.
18 Gruber (2001) obtains this number by using total wealth as the relevant pool of assets. If only liquid assets
are taken into account the share rises signiﬁcantly. This number therefore represents a lower bound for the
share of liquidity-constrained workers.
19however, allow for a positive habit value, ̺(1), for the richer workers in the estimation below. In
our model, consumption habits are mainly introduced so as to be in line with much of the recent
New Keynesian literature, in which habits are a modeling device which allows to introduce
further endogenous persistence in the aggregate model economy. We do not wish to let our
welfare estimates for the low-skilled, liquidity-constrained group of consumers be inﬂuenced by
such considerations. We target hours worked for the higher-skilled, h(1) = 1/3, which implies
κL = 64.74.
The OECD Labour Market Statistics (2001 Edition) report compensation before taxes in the US
for diﬀerent income deciles. We use this information for computing the relative skill/productivity
level of the two groups, a. We approximate the low-skilled consumers’ average income by a
weighted average of the income at the 10th percentile and the 20th income percentile. The
average level of the wage income in the asset-holding group is approximated by the 58th per-
centile (16%+84%/2) of the wage distribution. Dividing these two numbers and averaging over
the years, we obtain that the average wage per worker in the low-skilled, liquidity-constrained
population is about half the wage of the higher-skilled population.19 Consequently, we set the
relative technology to a = 0.5 (see section ‘Production’ in Table 1). All other parameters are
conventional. To ensure that our model generates an amount of ﬂuctuations of output of a
similar size as in the data, we set the autocorrelation of the technology shock such that the
implied standard deviation of the estimated model with respect to output roughly matches the
data. This choice reﬂects our clear prior that the model needs to embody a reasonable amount
of aggregate risk.
Turning to the labor market, we use the aggregate destruction rates reported in Shimer (2005),
and set a constant destruction rate of jobs per month of ϑ(o) = 3% for the higher- and for the
lower-skilled workers (see section ‘Labor market’ in Table 1). We normalize σ
(o)
m , the scaling
parameter in the respective matching functions, so as to attain a steady state probability of
ﬁnding a worker in a month’s time of q(o) = 0.73, which is the value used in den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000).
We set the value of the matching elasticity to ξ(o) = 0.5, in line with Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). We assume an equal-surplus-sharing-rule, setting the bargaining power to  (o) = 0.5.
Given that the goal of this paper is the provision of an upper bound for business cycle costs for
19 In computing this number, we use the entire span of data at our disposal. For the income deciles our data
range from the years 1973 to 2000. Given the well documented rise in wage inequality that started in the
1980s. Our estimate of relative productivity might therefore be rather conservative towards the upside.
20Table 1: Calibration to US
Parameter Value Target/reference Interpretation
Preferences and composition
1 − ν 0.16 Estimates by Gruber (2001). share of liquidity-constr. consumers.
β .9975 Annual real rate of 3 percent. time-discount factor.
ϕ 2.0 Estimates by Domeij and Flod´ en (2006). 1/labor supply elasticity.
σ 1.5 Estimates by Smets and Wouters (2007). risk-aversion.
̺(2) 0 No consumption habits for the poor. habit persistence liq.-constr. group.
κL 64.74 Average hours worked, h(1) = 1/3. scaling parameter disutility of work.
Production
A(1) .65 Normalize output, y, to unity. productivity of high-skilled workers.
a 0.50 w
(2)h
(2)
w(1)h(1), relative wage income of 50%. relative productivity low-skilled.
α 0.33 Conventional conﬁguration. capital elasticity of production .
δ .0081 (Investm.+durable cons.)/GDP = 24%. depreciation rate (monthly).
ǫ 21 Avg. price markup of 5%. demand elasticity wholesale goods.
γz .0106 z = 1, full steady state capacity util. steady state marg. capac. util. cost.
ρ
q
A .85 Std. deviation output, yt. autocorrelation technology (quarterly).
Labor market
ϑ(1) 0.03 Shimer (2005) for aggregate economy. monthly separation rate unconstr.
ϑ(2) 0.03 - ” - monthly sep. rate constr. workers.
σ
(1)
m .44 q(1) = 0.7, den Haan et al. (2000). eﬃc. of matching unconstr. worker.
σ
(2)
m .30 q(2) = 0.7, - ” for aggr. economy - eﬃc. of matching constr. worker.
 (1) 0.5 Equal surplus sharing rule. bargaining power asset holders.
 (2) 0.5 - ” - bargaining power liq.-constr.
ξ(1) 0.5 Estimates of aggr. matching function ... elasticity of matches w.r.t. unempl.
ξ(2) 0.5 ... (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). elasticity of matches w.r.t. unempl.
κ(1) .021 Economy-wide unemployment rate: 5.8%. Vacancy posting costs unconstr.
κ(2) .026 Low-skilled unemployment rate: 10%. Vacancy posting costs constr. worker.
b(1) .45 Std. deviation economy-wide u-rate, ut. real unempl. beneﬁt unconstr. worker.
b(2) .25 Std. deviation low-skilled u-rate, u
(2)
t . real unempl. beneﬁt constr. worker.
strike(o) 0 Calibration with high replacement rate. strike option bargaining, o ∈ {1,2}.
home(o) 0 Calibration with high replacement rate. home-production, o ∈ {1,2}.
Government
g .17 Cons. (non-dur.+services)/GDP = 59%. target level gov. spending.
Notes: Calibration strategy. For the ﬁgures reported, the data span is 1984:1 to 2005:4. Investment includes
ﬁxed private investment and durable consumption. Consumption includes non-durable consumption and services.
Parameter κ
L is adjusted so as to insure h
(1) = 1/3. Strictly speaking κ
L therefore depends on the estimated
value for the family’s habit persistence. Here we use the value of κ
L which is implied by the value of habit
persistence at the posterior mode, for the latter see Table 3.
21workers who might be strongly aﬀected by unemployment risk, we entertain a joint hypothesis
and identify these liquidity-constrained workers also with relatively lower skills. This mirrors the
fact that the likelihood of being liquidity-constrained is the higher the lower is an individual’s
educational attainment. A natural candidate proxy for unemployment ﬂuctuations among low-
skilled workers is the unemployment rate among high-school drop-outs. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics series for the unemployment rate for high-school drop-outs is available from 1992:q1
onwards. This sample seems too short to corroborate the economic ﬁt of the extended model
(which is done in Section 3.3). Consequently, we select the unemployment rate of those who
are 16 to 24 years old as representing unemployment among low-skilled, liquidity-constrained
consumers. This rate is almost perfectly correlated with the one for high-school drop outs during
their period of overlap.20 We set the average unemployment rate among the low-skilled (and by
assumption liquidity-constrained) workers to 10 percent which lies in between the means of the
two above-mentioned series. We target this value and an average economy-wide unemployment
rate of u = 5.8% to pin down the cost of posting a vacancy, κ(o), for both types of ﬁrms in
the labor sector. We adjust the threat point of the worker to match the right unemployment
volatility. In the benchmark calibration this is done by adjusting the respective replacement
income, b(o).
3.2 Priors and Posterior Mode
We focus our estimation on parameters that we have little information about and that are not
easily pinned down a priori. These are mainly parameters related to the shock processes, the
behavioral rule of the central bank and parameters that characterize some deviations from the
frictionless neoclassical world. The ﬁrst three columns in Table 3 present summary statistics of
the prior distribution for each of these estimated parameters. We report the mean of the prior
distribution, the standard deviation and the class of density which we use to model the prior.
The marginal priors are assumed to be independent.
The central bank’s behavioral equation is parameterized similar to Smets and Wouters (2007).
The smoothing coeﬃcient γ
q
R = γ3
R is distributed beta with mean 0.70 and standard deviation
0.15. The reaction coeﬃcients to inﬂation and output follow the proposal of Taylor (1993). For
the reaction to output growth we choose a prior mean of zero. The habit persistence parameter,
20 High-school drop-outs and workers at the lower range of the skill-distribution are over-represented in this
series. Those who seek higher education enter the relevant labor force only at around age 20 or older. Apart
from the length of the sample, our results are not aﬀected by the choice of data.
22Table 2: Implied Steady State
Variable Value Interpretation
Labor market - stocks and ﬂows
u(1) .05 high-skilled unemployment rate.
u(2) .10 low-skilled unemployment rate.
v(1) .083 high-skilled vacancies.
v(2) .079 low-skilled vacancies.
s(1) .57 probability of ﬁnding a job, high-skilled worker.
s(2) .27 probability of ﬁnding a job, low-skilled worker.
Labor market - replacement rate
b(1)/(w(1)h(1)) .62 replacement rate high-skilled worker.
b(2)/(w(2)h(2)) .70 replacement rate low-skilled worker.
Labor market - proﬁts
Ψ(1)/l(1) .0093 proﬁt to output ratio high-skilled worker.
Ψ(2)/l(2) .023 proﬁt to output ratio low-skilled worker.
Per capita consumption
c(1) .64 consumption by high-skilled consumer.
c
(2)
e .36 consumption by low-skilled employed consumer.
c
(2)
u .25 consumption by low-skilled unemployed consumer.
Hours worked when employed
h(1) .33 hours worked by high-skilled worker.
h(2) .30 hours worked by low-skilled worker.
Use of GDP
νi/y .24 investment to GDP ratio.
c/y .59 consumption to GDP ratio.
g/y .17 government consumption to GDP ratio.
νκ
(1)v
(1)+(1−ν)(κ
(2)v
(2))
y .0018 total vacancy posting costs to GDP.
Income side of GDP
whn/y .64 share of all labor income in GDP.
νrkk/y .31 capital income share.
Ψ/y .05 proﬁt share (wholesale and labor sector).
Notes: Selected features of the steady state. All values refer to a monthly frequency. In so far
as the steady state is aﬀected by the value of ̺
(1), all values reported here pertain to parameters
evaluated at their posterior mode, which is reported in Table 3.
23̺(1), is assigned a beta prior with mean 0.7 as in Smets and Wouters (2005) and a similar
standard deviation of 0.15. The Calvo probability, ωq, a priori would lie around 0.75 at the
quarterly frequency, implying an average price duration of a year in line with the results by Gal´ ı
and Gertler (1999).21 The degree of indexation of prices to lagged inﬂation, γp, is assigned a
mean of 0.4, close to the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2005). Turning to the investment
adjustment costs and capacity utilization costs, we use the posterior mode estimates of Smets
and Wouters (2005) as our priors. The scaling parameter of investment adjustment costs, κI, is
assigned a gamma prior with a mean equal to 5 and a standard deviation of 0.5. The curvature
of capacity utilization costs, γz,2, has a gamma prior with mean 0.3 and a standard deviation of
0.025.
The persistence parameters of the estimated AR(1) shock-processes are assumed to follow beta
distributions and are harmonized as much as possible. The auto-correlations of the shock pro-
cesses carry a prior mean of 0.85 (at a quarterly frequency) with a standard deviation of 0.1.
With regard to the cost-push shock we specify a prior mean correlation of 0.5 in quarterly terms,
halfway between the choices in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
The standard deviations of the innovations to the structural shocks ǫ
g
t, ǫI
t, ǫb
t, ǫC
t , A
(1)
t and ǫ
money
t
are assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions. With regard to the standard deviation of the
innovation to the monetary policy shock ǫ
money
t we set a prior mean of 0.015. This corresponds
to 1.5 basis points at a monthly rate. For the remaining shock processes we experimented with
the model in advance of the estimation. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 3 display the resulting
parameter values at the posterior mode together with an approximated standard deviation.
We next look deeper into the ﬁt of the model economy in economic terms.22
21 A duration of six months (half a year/two quarters) as in the micro-data of Bils and Klenow (2004) would
correspond to ω
q = 0.5. Recently, there has been an active literature how to reconcile the macro-econometric
results on price stickiness with the evidence of higher nominal ﬂexibility in micro-data. For example assuming
that production factors are ﬁrmspeciﬁc as in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) and Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2007) helps to dampen the response of inﬂation to marginal costs. The only feature working in this
direction in our model is variable capacity utilization. As highlighted by Smets and Wouters (2005), however,
the data do not support this feature as economically very important once one moves to general equilibrium.
Most prominently, for the eﬃcient bargaining framework the literature so far has not suggested a way to build
rigidity into x
L
t , the price of the labor good. In particular, wage rigidity does not help to achieve this, see
Krause and Lubik (2005).
22 Further statistics referring to the ﬁt of the model are summarized in Appendix C.
24Table 3: Priors and the Posterior Mode
prior posterior
mean std distr. mode std
Parameters of structural model
γ
q
R 0.70 0.150 beta 0.84 0.031
γπ 1.50 1.000 gamma 3.59 0.73
γy 0.50 0.200 gamma 0.64 0.19
γ∆y 0.00 0.100 normal 0.041 0.0092
̺(1) 0.70 0.150 beta 0.29 0.087
ωq 0.75 0.150 beta 0.70 0.057
γp 0.40 0.200 beta 0.12 0.12
κI 5.00 0.500 gamma 4.44 0.48
γz,2 0.30 0.025 gamma 0.30 0.025
Correlation of shocks
ρ
q
g 0.85 .100 beta 0.81 0.052
ρ
q
I 0.85 .100 beta 0.73 0.067
ρ
q
b 0.85 .100 beta 0.81 0.042
ρ
q
C 0.50 .200 beta 0.55 0.097
Standard deviation of shocks
σg .500 Inf inv. gamma 1.807 0.136
σI .100 Inf inv. gamma 0.910 0.122
σb .200 Inf inv. gamma 0.060 0.0089
σC 5.00 Inf inv. gamma 2.000 0.717
σA .100 Inf inv. gamma 0.472 0.035
σm .015 Inf inv. gamma 0.031 0.0029
Notes: Estimates of the posterior mode. The standard deviation is ob-
tained by a Gaussian approximation at the posterior mode. The observa-
tion sample is 1984:q1 to 2005:q4. Data from 1964:q1 to 1983:q4 are used
to start the Kalman ﬁlter. A superscript
q highlights that the parameter
has been re-scaled to quarterly frequency for better comparability with
the literature. For example, ρ
q
g = ρ
3
g.
253.3 Economic Evaluation of the Fit
The information of labor-market related time series so far has not been exploited systematically
in the estimation of the model parameters and the shock processes. In particular, we reserved
quarterly data for nation-wide unemployment,   ut, low-skilled unemployment,   u
(2)
t , aggregate
vacancies,   vt, and total wages,   wt +   ht +   nt, for validation purposes. Towards this aim, Figure
1 plots the actual data for these variables against the Kalman-smoothed model-based estimates
evaluated at the parameters of the posterior mode. Dots mark the actual observations. The
Kalman-Smoother uses only the information inherent in the six series which we used for the
estimation, namely output, consumption, investment, hours worked, inﬂation rates and interest
rates. The evolution of the labor market variables estimated using the Kalman-Smoother, which
is depicted by a red solid line in Figure 1, thus describes a genuine implication of the model and
is not due to any shocks being designed with a view to reproducing the behavior of the labor
market over the cycle. All information presented in this section refers to quarterly aggregates.23
A vertical dashed line marks the start of our observation sample in 1984:q1.
Figure 1: Kalman-Smoothed Estimates of Variables Not Used in Estimation
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Notes: The graphs show the actual data (black dotted line marked by larger dots) against the (Kalman-
smoothed) estimates originating from the model (red solid line) when parameters are evaluated at the pos-
terior mode. The Kalman-smoothed estimates use only the data series as information which were used in
the estimation. The graphs shown here are used as independent evidence of the model’s ﬁt. The data is of
quarterly frequency. All four series are HP(100,000) ﬁltered log series and scaled by 100 to represent per-
cent deviations. From left to right: nationwide unemployment rate, vacancies, real total wages, low-skilled
unemployment rate. A vertical dashed line marks the beginning of the sample period in 1984:q1.
The model replicates both the variability and the cyclical behavior of the unemployment and
vacancy data as can be inferred from the ﬁrst, second and fourth panel of Figure 1. The key
23 As we have discussed in Section 3.1, in our calibration we target the size of the unconditional standard
deviations of the two unemployment rates. We set the workers’ outside option accordingly. This does not by
itself ensure though that the model replicates the entire cyclical pattern of the respective unemployment rates.
26mechanism of the model which endogenously generates labor market ﬂuctuations relies on a not
too cyclical outside option of workers paired with a small steady state proﬁt share in the labor
good sector. Small proﬁts in steady state mean that a given real ﬂuctuation in proﬁts causes
large percentage ﬂuctuations. Since expected proﬁts are the driving force of vacancy posting
activity in the model, large percentage ﬂuctuations in proﬁts induce as strong ﬂuctuations in
employment as found in the data. The model also captures the cycles in the actual data for
wages (third panel of Figure 1).
In Table 4 we report second moments of key model variables against the moments measured in
the data. The model is able to rather accurately generate the properties of the US data that
either directly inﬂuence utility, such as consumption and hours worked, or which concern the
particular labor market risks we wish to study, for example unemployment. We conclude that
the model economy provides a good representation of the interplay of labor market risk and
aggregate risk in the US economy.
Table 4: Second Moments in the Model Compared to the Quarterly Data
Std. deviation Corr. with   y
quart
t AR(1) (qoq)
Variable (quart.) data model data model data model
  yt 1.61 1.71 1 1 0.94 0.91
  ct 1.15 1.34 0.73 0.52 0.92 0.93
  Rt 0.38 0.47 0.59 0.14 0.95 0.90
  πt 0.24 0.38 -0.04 0.10 0.54 0.47
  it 6.39 5.92 0.81 0.81 0.97 0.93
  ht +   nt 1.20 1.59 0.86 0.68 0.96 0.79
  wt +   ht +   nt 3.05 3.43 0.86 0.80 0.97 0.76
  wt 2.33 2.03 0.68 0.82 0.96 0.75
  ut 13.89 13.61 -0.92 -0.85 0.97 0.85
  u
(2)
t 12.41 12.16 -0.91 -0.87 0.94 0.92
  vt 18.81 18.53 0.82 0.76 0.97 0.64
Notes: The table compares unconditional second moments of variables as implied by the model
to their counterparts in the data. The ﬁrst two columns report unconditional standard devia-
tions, the next two columns report the contemporaneous correlation with output and the ﬁnal
two columns report quarter-on-quarter autocorrelation coeﬃcients. For the model moments,
parameters are evaluated at the posterior mode. For the data moments, all values are com-
puted from 1984:q1 to 2005:q4. All data are in logs, HP(100,000) ﬁltered and multiplied by
100 in order to express them in percent deviation from trend. All data and model counterparts
are in quarterly terms. From top to bottom: output per capita, consumption per capita, nom-
inal interest rate, GDP inﬂation rate, investment per capita, total hours worked, total wages,
hourly wage rate, unemployment rate, unemployment rate population 16-24, vacancies. Invest-
ment includes durable consumption. Consequently, consumption is computed as non-durable
consumption plus consumption of services.
27In the next section, we therefore use this model to ask which share of steady state consumption
the respective classes of workers would be willing to give up in order to avoid business cycle
ﬂuctuations.
4 Implications for Welfare
For calculating the costs of business cycles we set to zero all six innovations to aggregate shocks.
This eliminates ﬂuctuations of an individual’s unemployment risk with the business cycle. It
does not, however eliminate the entire risk of becoming unemployed, given that in steady state
workers will still move into and out of unemployment. The computation of the welfare measure
is explained below.
4.1 Welfare Criterion for Asset-holding Households
The welfare of an asset-holding family is given by
W
(1)
t =
 
c
(1)
t − ̺(1)c
(1)
t−1
 1−σ
1 − σ
− κL(1 − u
(1)
t )
 
h
(1)
t
 1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
 
W
(1)
t+1
 
.
Assigning λ
equiv,(1)
t times steady state consumption and the steady state allocation of unemploy-
ment and hours worked, counterfactual welfare for this group is given by
W
(1)
t =
 
λ
equiv,(1)
t
 1−σ 1
1 − β
  
c(1) − ̺(1)c(1) 1−σ
1 − σ
 
−
1
1 − β
 
κL(1 − u(1))
 
h(1) 1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
 
.
The consumption-equivalent is deﬁned by equating actual welfare with welfare under the coun-
terfactual allocation:
W
(1)
t ≡ W
(1)
t ⇒ λ
equiv,(1)
t .
The welfare measure reported below refers to the unconditional expected percent consumption-
equivalent, −E
 
log(λ
equiv,(1)
t )
 
∗ 100. In order to obtain an estimate of the welfare costs of
business cycles, we use second-order approximations as in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b).24
4.2 Welfare Criterion for Liquidity-constrained Workers
For liquidity-constrained consumers we also compute consumption-equivalents. In doing so, we
assume that a worker would need to forfeit the same percentage of consumption relative to
24 In more detail, our programs build on Matlab code for second-order approximations by Paul Klein (available at
http://economics.uwo.ca/faculty/klein/personal/code). Diﬀerentiation in the code is done numerically. The
code is described in Gomme and Klein (2006).
28steady state in both states of employment. Welfare costs can depend on the employment status
of the worker.
The welfare of an unemployed liquidity-constrained worker is given by
W
(2)
u,t =
 
c
(2)
u,t − ̺(2)c
(2)
t−1
 1−σ
1 − σ
+ βs
(2)
t Et
 
W
(2)
e,t+1
 
+ β(1 − s
(2)
t )Et
 
W
(2)
u,t+1
 
.
The welfare of an employed liquidity-constrained worker is given by
W
(2)
e,t =
 
c
(2)
e,t − ̺(2)c
(2)
t−1
 1−σ
1 − σ
− κL
 
h
(2)
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1 + ϕ
+ β(1 − ϑ(2))Et
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Welfare evaluated at welfare-equivalent consumption for the respective liquidity-constrained
worker is given by

 W
(2)
u
W
(2)
e

 = 1
[1−β(1−s(2))][1−β(1−ϑ(2))]−β2ϑ(2)s(2)

 1 − β(1 − ϑ(2)) βs(2)
βϑ(2) 1 − β(1 − s(2))


·



 
λ
equiv,(2),x
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 1−σ


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c
(2)
u −̺(2)c(2)
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1−σ  
c
(2)
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
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



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Superscript x in λ
equiv,(2),x
t indicates that we entertain three diﬀerent concepts of welfare mea-
sures for low-skilled, liquidity-constrained workers. One of these asks for the willingness to pay
by an unemployed worker:
W
(2)
u,t ≡ W
(2)
u ⇒ λ
equiv,(2),u
t .
Similarly, one can ask for the willingness to pay by an employed worker:
W
(2)
e,t ≡ W
(2)
e ⇒ λ
equiv,(2),e
t .
Alternatively, one can look at the average liquidity-constrained worker:
u
(2)
t W
(2)
u,t + (1 − u
(2)
t )W
(2)
e,t ≡ u(2)W
(2)
u + (1 − u(2))W
(2)
e ⇒ λ
equiv,(2)
t .
Also here the welfare measures reported below refer to the unconditional percent consumption-
equivalent, −E
 
log(λ
equiv,(2),x
t )
 
∗ 100.
4.3 The Composition of the Outside Option and The Welfare Costs
The baseline calibration followed Jung (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and set the
replacement rate of workers, b(o)
w(o)h(o), to a suﬃciently high value. As illustrated, this renders
29the model consistent with the business cycle evidence on labor market ﬂuctuations. Engen and
Gruber (2001) report an average replacement rate of unemployment insurance of 43% percent
for the US.25 The gaps between this number and the replacement rates of 62% and 72% of
steady state consumption for the two skill/wealth groups in our baseline represent the view that
even for liquidity-constrained workers there are strong family ties which de facto lead to almost
complete insurance.26
With this in mind, our results indicate that the higher-skilled family would be willing to give
up roughly 0.5% of steady state consumption in order to eliminate business cycle ﬂuctuations.
The lower-skilled workers have less to gain from an elimination of the cycle. Their welfare costs
run to about 0.19% of their steady state consumption levels, see the ﬁrst column of Table 5.
The entries can be interpreted as counterfactual premia for insurance against business cycle
risk. The welfare costs are signiﬁcantly higher than those of Lucas (1987). This is due to three
diﬀerences. First, the consumption process in our model reacts endogenously to the business
cycle and to aggregate risk. Not only is the consumption process more persistent than in Lucas’
estimate but, in addition, in our model the absence of business cycle ﬂuctuations induces a more
eﬃcient use of resources and thus a higher mean consumption value while in Lucas’s experiment
consumption was assumed to revert to its mean. Second, unemployment risk is endogenous
in our model economy. In a related paper, Costain and Reiter (2005b) build a real business
cycle model with heterogeneous agents and equilibrium unemployment. Their welfare costs of
business cycles are in the order of 0.2%-0.3% of steady state consumption. Third, the New
Keynesian frictions embodied into the model make business cycles more costly than in an RBC
environment. Capital adjustment costs, for example, mean that real resources are lost during
investment over the cycle. On top of this, price rigidities imply an ineﬃcient distribution of
production across ﬁrms. In a similar model as ours, but without search and matching frictions
and with only representative asset-holding consumers, Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams
(2005) in fact obtain even larger welfare costs of business cycles for a representative consumer
who does not face any liquidity constraints. Namely the authors ﬁnd welfare costs of business
cycles amounting to 2% of steady state consumption. An important friction driving their result
25 Eligibility for unemployment insurance and beneﬁt amounts in the US are determined by the State law
under which unemployment insurance claims are established. The exact amount replaced depends on pre-
unemployment earnings and State law. Minimum and maximum replacement income levels exist. In addition,
unemployment insurance claims are typically limited to 26 weeks. Unemployment insurance is considered
taxable income and must be reported as such on federal income tax forms.
26 That is, when taking also the value of leisure/the disutility of work into account.
30are wage rigidities, from which we abstract here.
Table 5: Welfare Costs of Business Cycles (in percent of steady state consumption)
Welfare costs family ties home-production beneﬁts only 10% beneﬁts
(1) .511 .554 .605 .588
(2) .195 .202 .474 1.359
e,(2) .196 .203 .470 1.338
u,(2) .194 .201 .489 1.414
Outside option [(1),(2)]
b/(wh) 62%, 72% 40%, 40% 40% , 40% 10%, 10%
home 0, 0 0.157, 0.107 0, 0 0, 0
strike 0, 0 0, 0 0.157, 0.107 0.377, 0.217
Notes: Welfare costs of business cycles. The table reports for the benchmark model (“family
ties”, ﬁrst column) and three scenarios for the welfare costs of business cycles. From top to
bottom: welfare costs for the family, (1), for the average liquidity-constrained worker, (2), for
an employed liquidity-constrained worker, e,(2), and for an unemployed liquidity-constrained
worker, u,(2). These are computed as the mean percent of steady state consumption which the
agent would be willing to forego if business cycles were eliminated. The ﬁnal three rows report
on the respective calibration of components of the outside option, listing the calibration for the
family (type (1)) ﬁrst.
Family insurance is not the only way to render the model consistent with the observed unemploy-
ment ﬂuctuations. Depending on the diﬀerent calibrations of the decomposition of the outside
option in use in this paper, we reinterpret the cause of a high outside option of the worker in
the bargaining process either as a cost of delaying the bargaining process to the next period
(strike cost) or as the true outside option value of being unemployed. In fact, any composition
of the outside option will amount to virtually the same behavior of unemployment rates and
other aggregates over the business cycle – as long as the average level of the outside option,
b(o) +home(o) +strike(o), remains unchanged. For example, even a liquidity-constrained worker
can eﬀectively self-insure against unemployment if he can compensate for the short-fall in income
by means of increasing home-production. We parameterize this as follows:
Home-production. The replacement rates for both types of workers are at 40% of steady state
wage income. This is a conventional value in calibrations, used for example by Shimer (2005), and
roughly in line with the replacement rates reported by Engen and Gruber (2001). The remainder
in the outside option is taken up by home-production, home(o). We set home(1) = 0.1573 and
home(2) = 0.1076, which preserves the same value of the outside option of the respective workers
as in the benchmark calibration.
31A ﬁnal alternative is that the bargaining position of the worker is favorable for a reason which
is not related to consumption streams when unemployed. Here, intuitively, the fall-back option
of the worker is delaying the production process by one month (striking), but not quitting the
bargaining process towards unemployment, see Hall and Milgrom (2007). This possibility is
captured by the following calibration:
Beneﬁts only. Replacement rates are 40% of steady state income. Workers cannot engage
in home-production of any sizeable value, home(o) = 0. The remainder in the outside option
relative to the benchmark calibration is taken up by setting a suﬃciently high value for parameter
strike(o). We set strike(1) = 0.1573 and strike(2) = 0.1076.
These three calibrations (“familiy ties”, “home-production”, “beneﬁts only”) constitute alter-
native explanations for the business cycle dynamics witnessed in the US and are observationally
equivalent as far as their macroeconomic outcomes are concerned.27 Table 5 reports the cor-
responding welfare costs of business cycles. A number of results are worth mentioning: First,
the decomposition of the outside option is of utmost importance for the welfare of liquidity-
constrained workers. The cost of business cycles for this group of agents rises by a factor of
two and a half when they just rely on 40% unemployment beneﬁts and are neither subsidized
through family ties nor can suﬃciently self-insure through home-production, compare column
‘beneﬁts only’ to the two columns to its left.
Second, and perhaps surprisingly, the welfare costs for the liquidity-constrained workers are not
uniformly higher than that of their well-insured family counterparts unless replacement rates
fall below 40%. In particular, in the benchmark calibration the family suﬀers two and a half
times more costs of business cycles than the liquidity-constrained worker. Implicitly, the two
sets of agents suﬀer diﬀerently from business cycles. While the low-skilled workers are primarily
aﬀected through an increase in ﬂuctuations of their real wage income, the family in addition
looses mean income and consumption due to investment frictions.
Towards eliciting an upper bound for welfare costs of business cycles, the last column in Table
5 shows a calibration with a very low average replacement rate:
10% unemployment beneﬁts only. Replacement rates are 10% of steady state wage income.28
27 We note that by construction none of these calibration changes the targeted steady state values. All scenarios
are meant to be alternative explanations of one and the same set of observations: the US business cycle. In
the scenarios entertained, second moments stay very similar to those reported for the benchmark in Table 4.
Also the business cycle evolution of the labor market continues to closely resemble Figure 1.
28 Some workers may not be eligible for the full amount of unemployment beneﬁts. US unemployment beneﬁts
typically do not extend beyond an unemployment spell of six months, for example, and are subject to suﬃcient
32This is the only source of funding for consumption. The remainder in the outside option is
taken up by parameters strike(1) = 0.3767 and strike(2) = 0.2169. Once the replacement falls
suﬃciently short of the labor income, the liquidity-constrained worker increasingly suﬀers from
unemployment due to the drop in consumption when unemployed. Since business cycles make
the incidence of a period of high and protracted unemployment (during a recession) more likely,
also the welfare costs of business cycles increase; compare the “family ties” and the “home-
production” scenarios in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 with the ﬁnal two columns. For a
low replacement rate, liquidity-constrained workers would be willing to pay more than twice as
much as the well-insured family for avoiding the business cycle.
In order to give a comprehensive picture of the welfare costs of business cycles, Figure 2 ﬁnally
traces out the welfare costs of business cycles when varying the replacement rate from 5% to
60% in the case of “beneﬁts only”. Parameters strike(o) take up the remainder in the outside
Figure 2: Welfare Costs of Business Cycles for Varying Replacement Rate
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Notes: The panels show the welfare costs of business cycles for diﬀerent groups of agents as the
replacement rate increases from 5% and 60% (with a step size of 0.5%). In each case, the gap in the
outside option relative to the estimated benchmark model being taken up by changes in parameters
strike
(1) and strike
(2). Left panel: welfare costs for liquidity-constrained consumers; red dots
mark the welfare costs for unemployed liquidity-constrained consumers, u,(2), blue diamonds
indicate the welfare costs for employed liquidity-constrained workers, e,(2). Right panel: welfare
costs for the asset-holding family.
option relative to the benchmark. Welfare costs for the liquidity-constrained consumers reach
2.8% when replacement rates are very low (say 5%) and fall to 0.26% when replacement rates are
prior employment.
33high (60%). The welfare costs for the family range around 0.5% of steady state consumption over
the entire range of replacement values, slightly rising as beneﬁts increase. This increase in the
welfare costs likely has to do with our assumption regarding taxation. Namely, as replacement
rates increase, the family itself does not gain in terms of insurance (family members perfectly
insure each other against unemployment regardless of the replacement rate). However, family
members also have to pay more transfers to liquidity-constrained workers as replacement rates
increase. These transfers vary with the business cycle as they are linked to unemployment
beneﬁts and thus depend on mean unemployment. Figure 2 also shows that numerically the
estimates of the welfare costs of business are a non-monotonous function of the replacement
rate. A similar non-monotonicity of second-order welfare estimates to changes in parameters
has been documented earlier by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004a).29
We would like to stress again the purely positive focus of our paper. In particular, our focus is
on the costs of business cycles for given replacement rates. We do not, in this paper, intend to
answer what the “optimal” replacement rate is. In computing the welfare costs of business cycles
for each replacement rate, we compared the welfare with business cycle ﬂuctuations prevailing
at this replacement rate to the welfare prevailing at the same replacement rate but without
ﬂuctuations. The steady state eﬀects of changes in policy on welfare can be big compared to
the eﬀect of business cycles.
Summarizing, our results suggest that even for the scenarios featuring lower replacement rates
the welfare costs of business cycles appear contained after all. Even workers who face on average
very high unemployment and very volatile and strongly counter-cyclical unemployment risk, and
who cannot self-insure against ﬂuctuations in employment and income but rather depend entirely
on unemployment beneﬁts when they lose their job, would be willing to spend at most 3% of
their monthly consumption stream to avoid the business cycle.
Of course, our model abstracts from a number of features that still might increase the actual
costs of business cycles. In particular, the model does not capture the drop in income when
workers reach the maximum duration of unemployment beneﬁts. In addition, the model does not
include the risk of becoming borrowing-constrained only in a recession (starting from a higher
consumption level and a positive wealth level). We furthermore rule out by assumption any
possible costs that might originate from a loss of human capital or from a loss of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
29 One reason for this non-monotonicity might be the fact that across experiments the steady states slightly
change, given that, in general equilibrium, the tax rules, for example, have to adjust to the new values. Even
though we tried to minimize these changes, they might add up to some error in the approximation.
34skills oﬀ the job and which might lead to a persistent transition from a higher skill and earnings
group to a lower income group (see, e.g., Krebs, 2007). These caveats notwithstanding, our
results suggest that the welfare costs of business cycles are larger than completely negligible but
that they still do not run to prohibitively high numbers.
4.4 The Costs Associated with Endogenous Unemployment Risk
In the model, an individual’s risk of becoming unemployed and the length of an unemployment
spell depend on the interaction of the labor market with business cycle shocks. The size of the
worker’s outside option in the bargaining process, as repeatedly emphasized above, determines
the size of unemployment ﬂuctuations. In this section, we ask which share of the welfare costs
just computed is due to the interaction of individual unemployment risk with the business cycle.
We compare three diﬀerent scenarios with a replacement rate of 40%. One of these is the beneﬁts
only scenario examined in Table 5 of the previous Section. Both alternatives which we exam-
ine here remove most of the unemployment ﬂuctuations from the model by setting parameters
strike(o) to zero for both types of workers. Table 6 reports the welfare costs of business cycles in
Table 6: Welfare Costs of Business Cycles – Little Endogenous Unemployment Risk
40% and strike > 0 std(  y
quart
t ) aﬀected std(  y
quart
t ) constant
Welfare Costs “beneﬁts only” strike = 0 strike = 0
(1) .605 .421 .570
(2) .474 .259 .351
e,(2) .470 .259 .350
u,(2) .489 .258 .349
Standard Deviations
  y
quart
t 1.72 1.47 1.72
  u
quart
t 13.64 3.33 3.89
  u
(2),quart
t 12.11 2.56 2.99
Notes: Welfare costs of business cycles when unemployment risk does not co-move as much with the
business cycle as in the baseline model. From top to bottom: welfare costs for the family, (1), for the
average liquidity-constrained worker, (2), for an employed liquidity-constrained worker, e,(2), and
for an unemployed liquidity-constrained worker, u,(2). The ﬁnal three rows report (for quarterly
averaged variables) the resulting standard deviations of output and of the unemployment rates for
the respective calibrations. The ﬁrst column repeats scenario beneﬁts only; the replacement rate
is 40% for both types of agents and parameter strike is set so as to replicate the unemployment
ﬂuctuations over the cycle. The second column, titled “strike = 0”, reports the welfare costs
and standard deviations when instead setting parameters strike
(o) to zero. This eliminates the
dependence of unemployment risk on aggregate risk to a large extent. The ﬁnal column reports the
same exercise, but now the standard deviations of all shocks were scaled up by a factor of 1.17 so
as to ensure that the standard deviation of output (as a measure of aggregate risk) is not aﬀected
by the change in the outside option.
35the respective cases. For comparison, for each scenario the standard deviations of output and of
unemployment rates are shown in the ﬁnal rows of Table 6. The ﬁrst column repeats the welfare
costs for the “beneﬁts only” scenario. The second column reports the welfare costs when the
replacement rates remain at 40% but when strike(o) = 0. The ensuing reduction in the outside
option of the worker relative to the benchmark removes much of the endogenous unemployment
risk. In fact, the standard deviation of unemployment for both types of workers falls by more
than a factor of four. This calibration is reminiscent of Shimer’s (2005) unemployment ﬂuctu-
ation puzzle. Evidently, when the amount of unemployment risk falls, welfare costs of business
cycles are reduced, compare the second column of Table 6. The welfare costs are roughly 0.2%
of steady steady consumption lower for all types of workers than in the baseline “beneﬁts only”
scenario. This means that welfare costs of business cycles for the liquidity-constrained workers
are cut by almost half.
The above counterfactual though yields only an upper bound for the importance of the co-
movement of unemployment risk with the business cycle. When reducing parameters strike(o) to
zero, not only the standard deviation of the unemployment rate falls but also the overall volatility
of the economy. The standard deviation of output,   y
quart
t , for example, falls by 0.25 percentage
points. Thus not only did unemployment risk fall but also aggregate risk as measured by the
standard deviation of output. In order to bracket the true costs of unemployment ﬂuctuations,
the ﬁnal column of Table 6 therefore reports the same experiment as above but re-scales the
standard deviations of all shocks by the same factor in such a way that the volatility of output
remains at the baseline level. As a result, the diﬀerences in welfare costs with and without
endogenous unemployment risk are smaller than before but still noticeable, see the third column
of Table 6. They range from 0.035% of steady state consumption for the family to 0.12% to
0.14% of steady state consumption for the low-skilled, liquidity-constrained consumers. For the
latter this amounts to a reduction of the welfare costs of business cycles by 25% relative to the
“beneﬁts only” case with strong unemployment ﬂuctuations.
In general equilibrium, an individual’s unemployment risk is, to a certain extent, determined by
the state of the business cycle. We conclude that by neglecting this endogeneity, welfare costs of
business cycles especially for liquidity-constrained workers may be underestimated by a quarter
to a half; or, put diﬀerently, according to our model one would underestimate the consumption
which these workers would be willing to forego in order to eliminate business cycles by 0.12%
to 0.2% of steady state consumption.
365 Conclusions
The welfare costs of business cycles crucially depend on the correlation of idiosyncratic labor mar-
ket risk and aggregate risk, the amount of self-insurance available and the amount of insurance
provided by the government. This paper developed a New Keynesian model with matching fric-
tions and liquidity-constrained consumers. The model was estimated on US data with Bayesian
techniques. The estimation procedure accounted explicitly for the frequency mismatch between
the model and the data. We illustrated that the model delivers a good representation of the
relationship between aggregate risk and individual labor market and unemployment risk. In
particular, the model replicates the ﬂuctuations of unemployment rates endogenously (without
the unemployment series being used in the estimation) and implies reasonable business cycle
statistics for many important endogenous variables.
We used this model to provide bounds for the costs of business cycles. We computed these
costs for diﬀerent assumptions regarding the eﬀectiveness of governmental unemployment ben-
eﬁt schemes and regarding the importance of self-insurance through family ties and home-
production.
Our lowest estimates for the costs of business cycles are an order of magnitude larger than
the estimates provided by Lucas (1987), owing to the real and nominal frictions in our model
economy, the endogeneity of the consumption process in the face of aggregate risk and the
endogeneity of unemployment risk over the business cycle. Liquidity-constrained consumers,
if they are well insured through family ties or home-production, would voluntarily forego at
least 0.19% of steady state consumption if in return all aggregate risk would be eliminated. For
a conventional replacement rate of 40% of steady state income, if no further self-insurance is
possible, the costs of business cycles for the lower-skilled, liquidity-constrained workers in our
model rise to about 0.5% of steady state consumption. Welfare costs of business cycles for
this group rise above 1% of steady state consumption only if replacement rates fall further, to
below 20% of steady state income. The results in our paper indicate that about one quarter to
one half of the business cycle costs which we estimate for the low-skilled, liquidity-constrained
consumers are due to the pure costs of the endogenous co-movement of unemployment risk with
the business cycle.
Yet overall, to us the level of business cycle costs appears to remain contained. This is the case
even for low-skilled workers who face a signiﬁcant unemployment risk, and who lack the funds to
self-insure. It appears that unless further propagation of unemployment risk to an individual’s
37life-time income risk is accounted for, a possibility which we do not examine in the current paper,
unemployment ﬂuctuations do not considerably increase the costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations
in economic terms.
While our estimates neglect a number of other potential sources of business cycle costs (but
also a number of mitigating forces), as far as being part of the low end of the wealth and skill
distribution is a persistent phenomenon, we view our estimates as a suggestive upper bound for
the welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the presence of equilibrium unemployment for
these relatively poor agents.
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A Source and Deﬁnition of the Data
Table 7: Data Used for Estimation and Veriﬁcation
Variable Formula
Consumption per capita c
quart
t = (PCESV+PCND)t/(4 × GDPDEFt · CNP16OVt).
Investment per capita i
quart
t = (PCDG+FPI)t/(4 × GDPDEFt · CNP16OVt).
Output per capita y
quart
t = GDPt/(4 × GDPDEFt · CNP16OVt).
Quarterly federal funds rate R
quart
t = 1 + FEDFUNDSt/400.
Quarterly inﬂation rate Π
quart
t = GDPDEFt/GDPDEFt−1.
Total hours worked (ht · nt)
quart = AWHNONAGt · (1 − UNRATEt/100).
Total wages (wt · ht · nt)
quart = WASCURt/(4 × GDPDEFt · CNP16OVt).
Unemployment rate ut = UNRATEt/100.
Unemp. rate liquidity-constr. u
(2)
t = LNS14024887t/100.
Vacancies vt = HELPWANTt.
Notes: Mnemonics in the formulae refer to the deﬁnitions in Table 8.
41Table 8: Description of Raw Data and Sources
Mnemonic Data description
Consumption of services PCESV Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates
billions of dollars.
Consumption of non-durables PCND Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates
billions of dollars.
Consumption of durables PCDG Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates
billions of dollars.
Fixed investment FPI Fixed Private Investment
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates
billions of dollars.
GDP deﬂator GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rate
index 2000=100.
Interest rate FEDFUNDS Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate
monthly average, % p.a.
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Labor force CNP16OV Civilian Noninstitutional Population
thousands,
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Output GDP Gross Domestic Product
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates
billions of dollars.
Total hours worked AWHNONAG Average Weekly Hours: Total Private Industies (index)
monthly, seasonally adjusted,
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Total wages WASCUR Compensation of Employees: Wages and Salary Accruals,
billions of dollars, quarterly,
seasonally adjusted at annual rate.
Unemployment rate UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
monthly, seasonally adjusted,
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Unempl. rate low-skilled LNS14027659 Unempl. Rate - Less than High School Diploma, 25 yrs and
over
monthly, seasonally adjusted,
source: Bureau of Labor Statistics,
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Vacancies HELPWANT Index of Help-Wanted Advertising
base year 1987=100, seasonally adjusted
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Youth unemployment rate LNS14024887 Unemployment Rate - 16-24 yrs,
monthly, seasonally adjusted,
source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Notes: All data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database FRED unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
42B Estimation Algorithm
For the estimation of our model we apply Bayesian techniques. The estimation methodology
consists of ﬁve steps. In step one we solve the linearized rational expectations model for a
given set of parameters. A non-standard feature is that the economy is modeled at a monthly
frequency in order to achieve consistency of the employment stock data in the US with the
employment ﬂow data but that it is estimated using data at a quarterly frequency. In step two
we thus derive a state-equation in quarterly terms and a measurement equation which links the
six observable variables to the vector of state variables. In step three the likelihood function is
evaluated using the Kalman ﬁlter. Step four involves combining this likelihood function with
a prior distribution over the parameters to form the posterior density function. The ﬁnal step
consists of numerically derive the moments of the posterior distribution of the parameters. We
compute the posterior mode and the Laplace approximation to the marginal data density. This
appendix summarizes the approach taken.
B.1 Observation and State Equation
We start by deriving our observation equation and the state equation for the Kalman ﬁlter.
Using these, the Kalman ﬁlter is standard; see e.g. Hamilton (1994, Ch. 13).
Observation Equation
For a particular set of parameters, the equilibrium law of motion of the linearized model takes
the form
yt = Fxxt + Fuut, (50)
where yt (ny x 1) collects the endogenous variables of the model in percent deviation from steady
state, xt (nx x 1) collects the endogenous states of the model, nx < ny, and ut (nu x 1) collects
the innovations of the model. Here a time index t refers to one month. The conformable matrizes
Fx and Fu are functions of the model parameters. The endogenous states of the monthly model
in equilibrium evolve according to
xt = Axxt−1 + Buut, ut
iid ∼ N(0,Ω), (51)
where Ax and Bu are again functions of the model parameters. By assumption, the econome-
trician can observe data only at a quarterly frequency. Let nz be the number of series which
43are observable each quarter. Let tq be the month at the end of an arbitrary quarter, q, and let
zq denote the observation of the vector of variables z in quarter q. The observable variables are
deﬁned as
zq = W0ytq + W1ytq−1 + W2ytq−2. (52)
Here zq is (nz x 1). Conformable matrices W0, W1 and W2 are of dimension (nz x ny). They
appropriately weight monthly endogenous variables for the quarterly observations. For the
construction of the weighting matrices using the precise empirical exercise of our paper see
Appendix B.3. Rewriting (52) in matrix form yields
zq = W


 

ytq
ytq−1
ytq−2


 

, (53)
where weighting matrix W = [W0,W1,W2]. Deﬁne the state vector ˜ xt by stacking endogenous
states in t and the innovations,
˜ xt ≡

 xt
ut

.
Using this deﬁnition, we can rewrite (50) as
yt = F˜ xt, (54)
where F = [Fx,Fu]. As a results, the vector of observable variables in (53), zq, can be expressed
as
zq = W˜ x

 


˜ xtq
˜ xtq−1
˜ xtq−2

 


, (55)
where weighting matrix W˜ x = [W0F,W1F,W2F]. Deﬁne ˜ x
long
q ≡ ˜ x
long
tq ≡


 

˜ xtq
˜ xtq−1
˜ xtq−2


 

. Using this
notation, the following equation (56) is our observation equation:
zq = W˜ x˜ xlong
q . (56)
State Equation
Stack xt in (51) and ut, so
˜ xtq = A˜ x˜ xtq−1 + B˜ uutq. (57)
44Here A˜ x =

 Ax 0
0 0

 and B˜ u =

 Bu
Inu

. Here Inu denotes an identity matrix of dimension
nu. Stacking further in order to produce a law of motion for ˜ x
long
tq gives
˜ x
long
tq = A˜ xlong˜ x
long
tq−1 + B˜ ulongutq, (58)
where A˜ xlong =


 

A˜ x 0 0
Inx+nu 0 0
0 Inx+nu 0


 

and B˜ ulong =


 

B˜ u
0
0


 

. Now substitute (58) iteratively
in (58) itself to obtain
˜ x
long
tq = A3
˜ xlong˜ x
long
tq−3
+A2
˜ xlongB˜ ulongutq−2 + A˜ xlongB˜ ulongutq−1 + B˜ ulongutq.
(59)
Collecting terms in (59) we have that
˜ x
long
tq = A3
˜ xlong˜ x
long
tq−3 + ǫq, (60)
where
ǫq ≡ A2
˜ xlongB˜ ulongutq−2 + A˜ xlongB˜ ulongutq−1 + B˜ ulongutq.
Since ut
iid ∼ N(0,Ω), from a quarterly perspective ǫq
iid ∼ N(0,Ξ) with
Ξ = A2
˜ xlongB˜ ulongΩB˜ ulong′A2
˜ xlong
′
+A˜ xlongB˜ ulongΩB˜ ulong′A˜ xlong′
+B˜ ulongΩB˜ ulong′.
(61)
Our state equation at a quarterly frequency is therefore given by
˜ x
long
q = A3
˜ xlong˜ x
long
q−1 + ǫq, (62)
with ǫq
iid ∼ N(0,Ξ) and Ξ given by (61).
B.2 Bayesian Estimation
Let θ denote the vector of parameters we estimate. θ contains all the model parameters,
including the second moments in variance-covariance matrix Ω. Let the prior be given by
p(θ). Marginal priors are assumed to be independent. Conditional on the parameters, θ, and
an initial state, ˜ x
long
0 = 0, the endogenous variables are normally distributed; compare (56) and
(62). Let L({zq};θ) denote the Gaussion likelihood of sample {zq} given θ. The likelihood is
45evaluated using a standard Kalman ﬁlter with the observation and state equation deﬁned in (56)
and (62). The posterior is given by
p(θ|{zq}) =
p(θ)L({zq};θ)
p({zq})
∝ p(θ)L({zq};θ).
The marginal data density is given by
p({zq}) =
 
p(θ)L({zq};θ)dθ.
B.3 Aggregation
This subsection discusses the time-aggregation conducted by matrix W˜ x in equation (55). In
the following let x
quart
q denote the observation in quarter q of a quarterly transformation of the
monthly variables xtq, xtq−1 and xtq−2. x
quart
q is one of the elements of the vector of observable
variables, zq. Hats, in   x
quart
q for example, denote percent deviations of a variable from its steady
state. Quarterly gross interest rates and gross inﬂation rates are not annualized and thus
computed as the product of their monthly counterparts. Consequently, log-linearized, we have
  Rquart
q =   Rtq +   Rtq−1 +   Rtq−2.
In each of the matrices W0,W1, and W2, in the row pertaining to   R
quart
q the weight in the column
belonging to   Rtq is therefore unity. Similarly,
  Πquart
q =   Πtq +   Πtq−1 +   Πtq−2.
As an example for a stock variable, the percent deviation of the average unemployment rate over
the quarter is (up to a ﬁrst-order approximation)
  u
quart
q =
u
quart
q −uquart
uquart
=
1
3(utq+utq−1+utq−2)− 1
3(u+u+u)
1
3(u+u+u)
=
1
3((utq−u)+(utq−1−u)+(utq−2−u))
1
3(u+u+u)
=
(utq−u)+(utq−1−u)+(utq−2−u)
(u+u+u)
=
(utq−u)+(utq−1−u)+(utq−2−u)
3u
= 1
3
 
utq−u
u +
utq−1−u
u +
utq−2−u
u
 
= 1
3
 
  utq +   utq−1 +   utq−2
 
.
Here uquart refers to the steady state of the average unemployment rate of a quarter, and u to the
steady state unemployment rate in an arbitrary month. Naturally, these two values coincide. In
46each of the matrices W0,W1, and W2, in the row pertaining to   u
quart
q the weight in the column
belonging to   utq are therefore equal to 1
3. Following the same lines, the percentage deviation
of average stock variables over the quarter is in general computed as the mean of the monthly
deviation. Consequently, the average vacancy posting activity is given by
  v
quart
q = 1
3
 
  vtq +   vtq−1 +   vtq−2
 
and the average wage rate over a quarter is
  w
quart
q = 1
3
 
  wtq +   wtq−1 +   wtq−2
 
.
As an example for a ﬂow variable, the percent deviation of quarterly GDP from steady state
(up to a ﬁrst-order approximation) is
  y
quart
q =
y
quart
q −yquart
yquart
= (ytq+ytq−1+ytq−2)−3y
3y
=
(ytq−y)+(ytq−1−y)+(ytq−2−y)
3y
= 1
3
 
ytq−y
y +
ytq−1−y
y +
ytq−2−y
y
 
= 1
3
 
  ytq +   ytq−1 +   ytq−2
 
.
In the row pertaining to   y
quart
q , the weights on   ytq are therefore equal to 1
3 in each of the matrices
W0,W1, and W2. Percent deviations of quarterly ﬂow variables are hence also computed as the
mean of the corresponding monthly observations. Consequently, the deviation of quarterly
consumption from steady state is
  c
quart
q = 1
3
 
  ctq +   ctq−1 +   ctq−2
 
,
the deviation of quarterly investment from steady state is
  i
quart
q = 1
3
 
  itq +  itq−1 +  itq−2
 
and, ﬁnally, the deviation of total hours worked in quarter q is given by
\ (h · n)
quart
q = 1
3
 
\ (h · n)tq + \ (h · n)tq−1 + \ (h · n)tq−2
 
.
47Table 9: Log Marginal Data Density
VAR(1) VAR(2) VAR(3) Model
Exact Laplace Exact Laplace Exact Laplace Laplace
-247.47 -248.32 -238.23 -240.50 -250.32 -254.75 -315.02
Notes: Marginal data density of Bayesian VARs with one to three lags under ﬂat priors, using the
Laplace approximation and the exact formula each. The model marginal data density is computed
using the Laplace approximation.
C Traditional Performance Measures
This appendix formally evaluates the statistical performance of the model. Table 9 shows the
marginal data density of the model using a Laplace approximation around the posterior mode.
As an empirical benchmark we report the marginal data density for Bayesian VARs up to a lag
order of three. Judging from a purely statistical perspective, the data density does not come
close to the data density of the non-structural competitors30 although section 3.3 presented
compelling economic evidence in the model’s favor.
Table 10: Model RMSE and Second Moments Compared to Data
  y
quart
t   c
quart
t   R
quart
t   π
quart
t   i
quart
t   hn
quart
t
RMSE (model) 0.55 0.41 0.11 0.23 1.81 0.46
RMSE (VAR) 0.46 0.33 0.11 0.20 1.33 0.30
Notes: The table compares root mean squared forecast errors of the model (in sample) at the
posterior mode to those of a VAR(1) with ﬂat priors at the posterior mode . All values are
computed from 1984:q1 to 2005:q4. All variables are in logs, HP(100,000) ﬁltered and multiplied
by 100 in order to express them in percent deviation from trend. All data are in quarterly
terms. From left to right: log output per capita, log consumption per capita log gross nominal
interest rate, log gross GDP inﬂation rate, log investment per capita, log total hours worked.
Investment includes durable consumption. Consequently, consumption is computed as non-
durable consumption plus consumption of services.
Table 10 contrasts the in-sample root-mean-squared forecast errors of the observable time-series
when using the model (ﬁrst row) with those obtained in a VAR(1) (second row). Apart from
the RMSE for investment, the model in terms of forecast errors does not look too far apart from
the VAR.
30 The VARs do not feature deterministics, i.e. especially no constant term, since the data is hp-ﬁltered.
48D Alternative Wage Bargaining
This appendix rationalizes our strike bargaining setup in the main text. The literature has
entertained a variety of possible threat points in the bargaining process, each having its appeal.
In this section, we follow Hall and Milgrom (2007) who argue that wages may not depend on
market tightness since quitting the bargaining process towards being unemployed would simply
not constitute a credible threat. Many assumptions have been made which yield similar wage
equations although starting from fairly diﬀerent economic assumptions about the bargaining
process. For example, Pissarides (2006) assumes that the wage is a weighted average of ﬁrm
revenue and ﬁxed unemployment beneﬁts, which in our notation, would give
w
(o)
t =  (o)xL
t A
(o)
t h
(o)
t + (1 −  (o))b(o). (63)
while Hall and Milgrom’s assumptions rely on a threat point unrelated to unemployment beneﬁts
which results in
w
(o)
t =  (o)xL
t A
(o)
t h
(o)
t + (1 −  )delay(o) (64)
where delay(o) is the worker’s remuneration of delaying the bargaining process for a full period
(in their case a day), see Hall and Milgrom (2007).31
To be more precise, we think of the delay above as strike money supplied by the family. That is
the worker does not threaten to become unemployed as in the standard Nash-bargaining, but is
threatening to exert zero eﬀort during one period. Both parties know that the wage negotiation
will resume in the next period, unless exogenous separation occurs. Here the assumption of sub-
game perfection is crucially important. The formulation in above papers allows us to continue
to rely on the same mechanism as in the main text, namely the one employed in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2006) and Jung (2005), who use a small match surplus to generate the right degree
of unemployment volatility. As argued in the main text, the benchmark calibration achieves
a small match surplus due to a high explicit or implicit replacement rate. This might lead us
to seriously underestimate the costs of business cycles. We therefore follow Hall and Milgrom
(2007) and assume that the outside option of the worker and ﬁrm is to delay the bargaining
by one period. For our purpose, we focus on the implication for the ﬁnal wage equation. We
assume that workers receive strike pay (which we will label b(o) + strike(o) to make clear the
31 Note that Hall and Milgrom (2007) employ a diﬀerent alternating oﬀer bargaining game to rationalize the
above equation, in particular for newly employed workers. However, the ﬁnal reduced form wage equation
would take a form like the one given above. Crucial to their argument is that a worker has a ﬂow gain from
delaying, while the ﬁrm has a ﬂow cost of not producing.
49similarity to the setup entertained in the main text) during the bargaining process while the
ﬁrm does not produce. In case the match is not separated, both parties reconvene in the next
period. Note that the outside option of delay/strike will never occur in equilibrium. The strike
money thus will not constitute a binding constraint on anybody’s resources in equilibrium.
The worker’s surplus in the bargaining is
∆
(1)
t =
 
w
(1)
i,t h
(1)
i,t − κL
 
h
(1)
i,t
 1+ϕ
λt(1+ϕ) − b(1) − strike(1)
 
. (65)
The ﬁrm’s surplus is
Ψ
(1)
t = xL
t A
(1)
t h
(1)
i,t − w
(1)
i,t h
(1)
i,t . (66)
Both the ﬁrm’s and the worker’s surplus do not depend on the continuation value. By assump-
tion, future wages and hours are taken as given and beyond the control of workers and ﬁrms in
this period. Through this assumption of the continuation values of the “delay” option and the
agreement option are equal.
Nash bargaining over the surplus
arg max
w
(1)
t ,h
(1)
t
(∆
(1)
t ) (1)
(Ψ
(1)
t )1− (1)
, (67)
results in the same ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked as in our benchmark model:
κL
 
h
(1)
t
 ϕ
λt
= xL
t A
(1)
t .
And also the wage equation looks remarkably similar:
w
(1)
t h
(1)
t =  (1)
 
A
(1)
t h
(1)
t xL
t
 
+(1 −  (1))
 
b(1) + strike(1) + 1
1+ϕmrs
(1)
t h
(1)
t
  (68)
The only term that is missing relative to the model entertained in the main text is the reference
to market tightness. This is due to the fact that the outside option in the bargaining game
is no longer unemployment but rather delaying the process of agreement. All other equations
are unaﬀected. This modeling choice therefore makes the wage-setting, which is the primary
mechanism in our model for generating unemployment ﬂuctuations, independent of the realized
utility diﬀerential between employment and unemployment. By varying this diﬀerence we can
provide bounds for business-cycle costs without running into Shimer’s (2005) puzzle of low
unemployment ﬂuctuations. A similar logic and algebra applies for the bargaining of liquidity-
constrained workers.
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